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ABSTRACT
This article investigates privacy risks to those visiting health-
related web pages. The population of pages analyzed is
derived from the 50 top search results for 1,986 common
diseases. This yielded a total population of 80,124 unique
pages which were analyzed for the presence of third-party
HTTP requests. 91% of pages were found to make requests
to third parties. Investigation of URIs revealed that 70% of
HTTP Referer strings contained information exposing spe-
cific conditions, treatments, and diseases. This presents a
risk to users in the form of personal identification and blind
discrimination. An examination of extant government and
corporate policies reveals that users are insufficiently pro-
tected from such risks.
General Terms
Privacy, Health, Web, Tracking
1. INTRODUCTION
Privacy online is an increasingly popular field of study, yet
it remains poorly defined. “Privacy” itself is a word which
changes according to location, context, and culture. Ad-
ditionally, the web is a vast landscape of specialized sites
and activities which may only apply to a minority of users
- making defining widely-shared privacy concerns difficult.
Likewise, as technologies and services proliferate, the line
between on- and off-line is increasingly blurred. Researchers
attempting to make sense of this rapidly changing environ-
ment are frequently stymied by such factors. Therefore, the
ideal object of study is one which is inherently sensitive in
nature, applies to the majority of users, and readily lends
itself to analysis. The study of health privacy on the web
meets all of these criteria.
Health information has been regarded as sensitive since the
time of the ancient Greeks. In the 5th century B.C., physi-
cians taking the Hippocratic Oath were required to swear
that: Whatever I see or hear in the lives of my patients...I
will keep secret, as considering all such things to be pri-
vate.[20] This oath is still in use today, and the importance of
health privacy remains universally recognized. However, as
health information seeking has moved online, the privacy of
a doctor’s office has been traded in for the silent intrusion of
behavioral tracking. This tracking provides a valuable van-
tage point from which to observe how established cultural
norms and technological innovations are at odds.
Online health privacy is an issue which affects the majority
of Internet users. According to the Pew Research Center,
72% of adult Internet users in the U.S. go online to learn
about medical conditions.[9] Yet only 13% of these begin
their search at health-specific sites. In fact, health informa-
tion may be found on a wide spectrum of sites ranging from
newspapers, discussion forums, to research institutions. In
order to discover the full range of sites users may visit when
seeking health information, I used a search engine to iden-
tify 80,142 unique health-related web pages by compiling
responses to queries for 1,986 common diseases. This se-
lection of pages represents what users are actually visiting,
rather than a handful of specific health portals.
Having identified a population of health-related web pages,
I created a custom software platform to monitor the HTTP
requests initiated to third-parties. I discovered that 91%
of pages make requests to additional parties, potentially
putting user privacy at risk. Given that HTTP requests
often include the URI of the page currently being viewed
(known as the “Referer” [sic]), information about specific
symptoms, treatments, and diseases may be transmitted.
My analysis shows that 70% of URIs contain such sensitive
information.
This proliferation of third-party requests makes it possible
for corporations to assemble dossiers on the health condi-
tions of unwitting users. In order to identify which corpora-
tions are the recipients of this data I have also analyzed the
ownership of the most requested third-party domains. This
has produced a revealing picture of how personal health in-
formation becomes the property of private corporations.
This article begins with a short primer on how third-party
HTTP requests work, moves on to previous research in this
area, details methodology and findings, and concludes with
suggestions for protecting health privacy online.
2. BACKGROUND: THIRD-PARTY HTTP RE-
QUESTS
A real-world example is the best way to understand how the
information is leaked to third-parties on a typical web page.
When a user searches online for “HIV” one of the top results
is for the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
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Figure 1: First- and Third-Party Requests on the CDC Web Page for HIV/AIDS
(CDC) page with the address “http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/”1.
Clicking on this result initiates what is known as a “first-
party” Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) request to the
CDC webserver (Figure 1.1). A portion of such a request is
as follows:
GET /hiv/
Host: www.cdc.gov
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh...
This request is sent to the CDC webserver (“Host: www.cdc.gov”)
and is an instruction to return (“GET”) the page with the
address “/hiv/”. This request also includes “User-Agent” in-
formation which tells the server what kind of browser and
computer the user has. In this case, the user employs the
Mozilla Firefox browser on a Macintosh computer. Such in-
formation is helpful when loading specially-optimized pages
for smartphones or tablets.
Once this request has been made, the CDC webserver sends
the user an HTML file. This file contains the text of the page
as well as a set of instructions that tells the web browser how
to download and style additional elements such as images
(Figure 1.2). In order to get the CDC logo, the following
HTTP request is made:
GET /TemplatePackage/images/cdcHeaderLogo.gif
1As of April, 2014
Host: www.cdc.gov
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh...
Referer: http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/
This request introduces a new piece of information called the
“Referer”. The“Referer”contains the address of the page the
user is currently viewing. The CDC web server may keep
records of all HTTP requests in order to determine what
pages and content are being requested most often.
Because the“Host”for both requests is identical (www.cdc.gov),
the user is only interacting with a single party and such re-
quests are called “first-party requests”. The only two parties
who know that the user is looking up information about HIV
are the user and the CDC. However, the HTML file also con-
tains code which makes requests to outside parties. These
types of “third-party requests” typically download “third-
party elements” such as images and javascript. Due to the
fact that users are often unaware of such requests, they form
of the basis of the so-called “invisible web”.
On the CDC’s HIV page, third-party requests are made to
the servers of Facebook, Pinterest, Twitter, and Google. In
the case of the first three companies, the requested elements
are all social media buttons which allow for the sharing of
content via the “Recommend”, “Tweet”, or “Pin It” icons
(Figure 1.3). It is unlikely that many users would under-
stand that the presence of these buttons indicates that their
data is sent to these companies. In contrast, the Google
elements on the page are entirely invisible and there is no
Google logo present. One of these requests is sent to Google’s
Analytics service (Figure 1.4) to download a file containing
Javascript code:
GET /ga.js
Host: www.google-analytics.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh...
Referer: http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/
Again, the “Referer” field reveals that the user is visiting
a page about HIV. By pairing information about the User-
Agent, Referer, and user’s IP address, it is possible for com-
panies like Google and Facebook to identify people who are
concerned with HIV.[33] In all likelihood those visiting this
page are unaware of this fact, and would not be happy to
find out.
3. PRIOR RESEARCH
Prior research has demonstrated that while users are un-
comfortable with this type of tracking, it is performed in a
number of highly sophisticated ways, and it is increasingly
widespread.
3.1 Attitudes
There has long been anxiety about how personal data will
be used on the web. A 1999 study determined that “only
13% of respondents reported they were ‘not very’ or ‘not at
all’ concerned” about their privacy online.[2] Such anxiety
remained in 2003 when 70% of survey respondents reported
that they were nervous that websites had information about
them.[28] A 2009 follow-up study revealed that 67% of re-
spondents agreed with the statement that they had “lost all
control over how personal information is collected and used
by companies”.[29] These surveys demonstrate that the ac-
tivities of many businesses run directly counter to public
preferences.
As with general concerns with online privacy, there is excel-
lent research exploring attitudes towards health information.
In 2012, Hoofnagle et al determined that only 36% of survey
respondents knew that advertisers are allowed to track their
visits to health-related websites.[12] An extensive study from
the year 2000 found that 85% of Internet users in poor health
were concerned that websites would share their data, and
only 3% were comfortable with websites sharing their data
with “other sites, companies, and advertisers”.[10] Despite
these fears, 44% of respondents felt that their information
was safe with institutions such as the National Institutes of
Health (NIH).[10] The above CDC example indicates that
this trust is potentially misplaced.
3.2 Mechanisms
Once a third-party request is made, a user may be tracked
using a number of ever-evolving technical mechanisms. Re-
searchers have been tracing the development of such mech-
anisms for years, often analyzing the code and behaviors
which take place within the web browser. These are of-
ten called “client-side” techniques for they take place on the
user’s computer. Traditional client-side techniques typically
involve storing data on the user’s computer in small text
files known as “cookies” - this functions as a sort of digital
name-tag.[3] Users are getting more adept at evading such
practices, therefore newer techniques often employ so-called
“browser fingerprinting” to identify users based on charac-
teristics of their computers. This area of research has proven
very popular as of late with numerous studies investigating
fingerprinting techniques.[13][7][14][22][1] In addition, Miller
et al have recently demonstrated sophisticated attacks on
HTTPS which are able to reveal “personal details including
medical conditions.”[?]
Turning attention to the server-side, Yen et al have recently
demonstrated a tracking technique which utilizes a combi-
nation of IP address, User-Agent string, and time intervals
when HTTP requests were made. This team was able iden-
tify users 80% of the time, which is on par with what is typi-
cally accomplished with client-side cookies.[33] Furthermore,
identification rates remained essentially static even when re-
moving the final octet of the IP address, which is a common
technique by which major advertisers claim to anonymize
data. Yen et al’s findings indicate that while novel tech-
niques may be needed on the client-side, the lowly HTTP
request is sufficient for advanced server-side techniques.
3.3 Measurement
The final area of related research is measurement. Measure-
ment of web tracking generally entails two steps: selecting a
population of pages, and performing automated analysis of
how user data is transmitted to third parties. Many stud-
ies have relied on “popular site” lists provided by the Alexa
company[18][4][17][24], but often utilize their own method-
ologies for analysis. Krishnamurthy and Wills have con-
ducted many of the most important studies in this area[18]
and developed the idea of a “privacy footprint”[17] which is
based upon the number of “nodes” a given user is exposed
to as they surf the web. This team has consistently found
that there are high levels of tracking on the web, including
on sites dealing with sensitive personal information such as
health.[17] Other teams have performed comparative anal-
yses between countries[4] as well as explored general trends
in tracking mechanisms.[19][24] A common theme among all
measurement research is that the amount of tracking on the
web is increasing, and shows no signs of abating. The data
presented in this article updates and advances extant find-
ings with a focus on how users are tracked when they seek
health information online.
4. METHODOLOGY
In order to quickly and accurately reveal third-party HTTP
requests on health-related web pages, my methodology has
four main components: page selection, third-party request
detection, request analysis, and corporate ownership analy-
sis.
4.1 Page Selection
A variety of websites such as newspapers, government agen-
cies, and academic institutions provide health information
online. Thus, limiting analysis to popular health-centric
sites fails to reach many of the sites users actually visit.[16]
To wit, the Pew Internet and American Life Project found
that“77% of online health seekers say they began at a search
engine such as Google, Bing, or Yahoo”[9] as opposed to a
health portal like WebMD.com. In order to best model the
pages a user would visit after receiving a medical diagno-
sis, I first compiled a list of 1,986 diseases and conditions
based on data from the Centers for Disease Control, the
Mayo Clinic, and Wikipedia. Next, I used the Bing search
API in order to find the top 50 search results for each term.2
Once duplicates and binary files (pdf, doc, xls) were filtered
out, a set of 80,142 unique web pages remained. A major
contribution of this study to prior work is the fact that my
analysis is focused on the pages which users seeking medical
information are most likely to visit, irrespective of if the site
is health-centric.
4.2 Third-Party Request Detection
To detect third-party HTTP requests, my methodology em-
ploys a“headless”web browser named PhantomJS.[23] Phan-
tomJS requires no GUI, has very low resource utilization,
and is therefore well suited for large-scale analyses. Due to
the fact that it is built on WebKit, PhantomJS’s underlying
rendering engine is capable of executing Javascript, setting
and storing cookies, and producing screen captures. Most
important for this project, PhantomJS allows for the direct
monitoring of HTTP requests without the need to resort to
browser hacks or network proxies.
It should be noted that the most recent versions of Phan-
tomJS (1.5+) do not support the Adobe Flash browser plug-
in. To address this potential limitation, I conducted test-
ing with an older version of PhantomJS (1.4) and Flash.
The inclusion of Flash led to much higher resource utiliza-
tion, instability, and introduced a large performance penalty.
While this method successfully analyzed Flash requests, I
determined that Flash elements were comparatively rare and
had negligible effect on the top-level trends presented below.
Therefore, I made the decision to forgo analysis of Flash re-
quests in favor of greater software reliability by using the
most recent version of PhantomJS (1.9).
In order to fully leverage the power of PhantomJS, I created
a custom software platform named webXray which drives
PhantonJS, collects and analyzes the output in Python, and
stores results in MySQL. The workflow begins with a pre-
defined list of web page addresses which are ingested by a
Python script. PhantomJS then loads the given web ad-
dress, waits 30 seconds to allow for all redirects and con-
tent loading to complete, and sends back JSON-formatted
output to Python for analysis. This technique represents
an improvement over methods such as searching for known
advertising elements detected by popular programs such as
Ghostery or AdBlock.[4] As of March 2014, Ghostery re-
ports that the WebMD web page for “HIV/AIDS” contains
four trackers. In contrast, webXray detects the same page
initiating requests to thirteen distinct third-party domains.
This is due to the fact that Ghostery and AdBlock rely on
curated “blacklists” of known trackers, rather than reporting
all requests.
4.3 Request Analysis
The primary goal of webXray is to identify third-party re-
quests by comparing the domain of the web page being
visited to the domains of requests being made. For ex-
ample, the address “http://example.com/” and the request
2Search results were localized to US/English.
“http://images.example.com/logo.png” both share the do-
main “example.com”, thus constituting a first-party request.
Alternately, a request from the same page to“http://www.google-
analytics.com/ga.js”, which has the domain“google-analytics.com”,
is recognized as a third-party request. The same technique
for HTTP requests is also applied towards evaluating the
presence of third-party cookies. The method is not flaw-
less, as a given site may actually use many domains, or a
subdomain may point to an outside party. However, when
evaluating these types of requests in aggregate, such prob-
lems constitute the statistical noise which is present in any
large dataset.
Finally, in order to evaluate larger trends in tracking mech-
anisms, third-party requests are dissected to extract argu-
ments (e.g. “?SITEID=123”) and file extensions such as .js
(Javascript), .jpg (image), and .css (cascading style sheet).
Removing arguments also allows for a more robust analy-
sis of which elements are the most prevalent, as argument
strings often have specific site identifiers, making them ap-
pear unique when they are not.
4.4 Corporate Ownership
A specific focus of this investigation is to determine which
corporate bodies are receiving information from health-related
web pages. While it is possible to programmatically detect
requests to third-party domains, it is not always clear who
the requested domains belong to. By examining domain reg-
istration records, I have been able to pair seemingly-obscure
domain names (e.g. “2mdn.net”, “fbcdn.net”) with their cor-
porate owners (e.g. Google, Facebook). This process has
allowed me to follow the data trail back to the corporations
which are the recipients of user data. To date the literature
has given much more attention to technical mechanisms, and
much less to the underlying corporate dynamics. This fresh
analytical focus highlights the power of a handful of corpo-
rate giants.
4.5 Limitations
While this methodology is resource efficient and performs
well at large scale, it comes with several potential limita-
tions, many of which would produce an under-count of the
number of third-party requests. First, given the rapid rate
by which pages are accessed, it is possible that rate limit-
ing mechanisms on servers may be triggered (i.e. the re-
quests generated by my IP would be identifiable as auto-
mated), and my IP address could be blacklisted, resulting
in a under-count. Second, due to the fact that I use Phan-
tomJS without browser plugins such as Flash, Java, and
Silverlight, some tracking mechanisms may not load or ex-
ecute properly, resulting in an under-count. Third, many
tracking mechanisms are designed to be difficult to detect
by a user, and an under-count could result from a failure to
detect particularly clever tracking mechanisms. Therefore,
the findings presented below constitute a lower bound of the
amount of requests being made.
5. FINDINGS
In April 2014, I scanned 80,142 web pages which were col-
lected from search results for 1,986 common diseases with
the intent of detecting the extent and the ways in which the
sensitive health data of users was being leaked.
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Figure 2: Prevalence of Third-Party Requests, Javascript, and Cookies by TLD
5.1 General Trends
I have broken up my top-level findings into five general cat-
egories based on information gleaned from the TLDs used.
They are: all pages, commercial pages (.com), non-profit
pages (.org), government pages (.gov), and education-related
pages (.edu). This information is illustrated in Figure 2.
Of all pages examined, 91% initiate some form of third-
party HTTP request, 86% download and execute third-party
Javascript, and 71% utilize cookies. Unsurprisingly, com-
mercial pages were above the global mean and had the most
third-party requests (93%), Javascript (91%), and cookies
(82%). Education pages had the least third-party HTTP
requests (76%) and Javascript (73%), with a full quarter of
pages free of third-party requests. Government pages stood
out for relatively low prevalence of third-party cookies, with
only 21% of pages storing user data in this way. Figure 2
presents these findings in greater detail.
5.2 Mechanisms
Given that 91% of pages make third-party HTTP requests,
it is helpful to know what exactly is being requested. Many
third-party requests lack extensions, and when viewed in
a browser display only blank pages which generate HTTP
requests and may also manipulate browser caches. Such re-
quests accounted for 47% of the top 100 requests and may
point towards emerging trends in the ongoing contest be-
tween user preferences and tracking techniques. The second
most popular type of requested elements were Javascript
files (33%). These files are able to execute abitrary code in
a user’s browser and may be used to perform fingerprinting
techniques, manipulate caches and HTML5 storage, as well
as initiate additional requests. The third most popular type
of content is the tried-and-true image file, which accounts
for 8% of the top requested elements. Table 1 presents ad-
ditional detail into the file extensions found.
Given that tracking occurs on the so-called “invisible web”
it initially appears odd that so many mechanisms are im-
ages. However, when investigating the images themselves,
it is clear that they provide little indication as to who they
belong to, and thus users are kept in the dark as to their
purpose or presence. An examination of the top 100 re-
quested images determined that only 24% contained infor-
mation which would alert the user that they had initiated
contact with a third party. Many images were only a single
pixel in size, and are often referred to as “tracking pixels” as
their only purpose is to initiate HTTP requests. The most
popular image, found on 45% of pages, was a single tracking
pixel with the name “ utm.gif” which is part of the Google
Analytics service. The second most popular image is the
clearly identifiable Facebook “Like” button which was found
on 16% of pages. It is unclear how many users elect to“Like”
an illness, but Facebook is able to record page visits regard-
less of if a user clicks the “Like” button, or if they even have
a Facebook account in the first place. Google and Facebook
are not alone however, there are a number of companies
tracking users online.
Table 1: Types of File Extensions
Type %
No Extension 47
Javascript 33
Image 8
Dynamic Page 4
Other 8
5.3 Corporate Ownership
While security and privacy research has often focused on how
user privacy is violated, insufficient attention has been given
to who is collecting user information. The simple answer is
that a variety of advertising companies have developed a
massive data collection infrastructure which is designed not
only to avoid detection, but also ignore, counteract, or evade
user attempts at limiting collection. Despite the wide range
of entities collecting user data online, a handful of privately-
held American advertising firms dominate the landscape of
the invisible web.
78% of pages analyzed included elements which were owned
by Google. Such elements represent a number of hosted
services and use a variety of domain names: they range
from traffic analytics (google-analytics.com), advertisements
(doubleclick.net), hosted Javascript (googleapis.com), to videos
(youtube.com). Regardless of type of services provided, in
some way all of these HTTP requests funnel information
back to Google. This means that a single company has the
ability to record the web activity of a huge number of indi-
viduals seeking sensitive health-related information without
their knowledge or consent.
While Google is the gorilla in the room, they are far from
alone. Table 2 details the top 10 companies found as part
of this analysis along with the rankings of two data brokers.
In second place is comScore who are found on 38% of pages,
followed by Facebook with 31%. It is striking that these two
companies combined are still have less reach than Google.
Additionally, companies were categorized according to their
type of revenue model. 80% of the top ten companies are
advertisers. The only exceptions to this rule are Adobe and
Amazon. Adobe offers a mix of software and services, in-
cluding traffic analytics. Amazon is in the business of both
consumer-retail sales as well as web hosting with the Ama-
zon Web Services (AWS) division. At present it is unclear
if AWS data is integrated into Amazon product recommen-
dations or deals, but the possibility exists.
While advertisers dominate online tracking, I was also able
to detect two major data brokers: Experian (5% of pages),
and Acxiom (3% of pages). The main business model of
data brokers is to collect information about individuals and
households in order to sell it to financial institutions, em-
ployers, marketers, and other entities with such interest.
“Credit scores” provided by Experian help determine if a
given individual qualifies for a loan, and if so, at what inter-
est rate. Given that a 2007 study revealed that “62.1% of
all bankruptcies...were medical”[11], it is possible that some
data brokers not only know when a given person suffered
a medical-related bankruptcy, but perhaps even when they
first searched for information on the ailment which caused
their financial troubles.
5.4 Health Information Leakage
The HTTP 1.1 protocol specification warns that “the source
of a link [URI] might be private information or might re-
veal an otherwise private information source” and advises
that “[c]lients SHOULD NOT include a Referer header field
in a (non-secure) HTTP request if the referring page was
transferred with a secure protocol”.[8] In simpler terms, web
pages that include third-party elements, but do not use
secure HTTP requests, risk leaking sensitive data via the
“Referer” field. Of the pages analyzed, only 3.24% used se-
cure HTTP, the rest used non-encrypted HTTP connections
and thereby potentially transmitted sensitive information to
third parties. Unsurprisingly, a significant amount of sensi-
tive information was included in URI strings.
Based on a random sample of 500 URIs taken from the pop-
ulation of pages analyzed (N=80,142), 70% contained infor-
mation related to a specific symptom, treatment, or disease.
An example of an URI containing specific symptom infor-
mation is:
http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/breast-lump/[...]
a URI containing no such information is:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21722252
Given that the former type of URI was by far the most preva-
lent, it may be seen that third-parties are being sent a large
volume of sensitive URI strings which may be analyzed for
the presence of specific diseases, symptoms, and treatments.
This type of leakage is a clear risk for those who wish to
keep this information out of the hands of third-parties who
may use it for unknown ends.
6. DISCUSSION
Defining privacy harms is a perennially difficult proposi-
tion. Health information, however, presents two main pri-
vacy risks which are interrelated. The first is personal iden-
tification, where an individual’s name is publicly associated
with their medical history. The second is blind discrimina-
tion, where an individual’s name is not necessarily revealed,
but they may be treated differently based on perceived med-
ical conditions.
6.1 Personal Identification
While most people would probably consider details of their
health lives to be of little interest or value to others, such de-
tails form the basis of a lucrative industry. In 2013, the US
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transporta-
tion released a highly critical review of the current state of
the so-called “data broker” industry. Data brokers collect,
package, and sell information about specific individuals and
households with virtually no oversight. This data includes
demographic information (ages, names and addresses), fi-
nancial records, social media activity, as well as information
on those who may be suffering from “particular ailments,
including Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, anxiety,
depression...among others”.[25] One company, Medbase200,
was reported as using “proprietary models” to generate and
sell lists with classifications such as “rape sufferers”, “domes-
tic abuse victims”, and “HIV/AIDS patients”.[6]
It should also be noted that such models are not always
accurate. For example, individuals looking for information
on the condition of a loved one may be falsely tagged as
having the condition themselves. This expands the scope
of risk beyond the patient to include family and friends.
In other cases, an individual may be searching for health
information out of general interest and end up on a data
broker’s list of “sufferers” or “patients”. Common clerical
and software errors may also tag individuals with conditions
they do not have. The high potential for such errors also
highlights the need for privacy protections.
Table 2: Corporate Ownership and Risk Assessment (N=80,142)
Rank % Pages Company Revenue Identification Blind Discrimination
1 78 Google Advertising X X
2 38 comScore Advertising – X
3 31 Facebook Advertising X X
4 22 AppNexus Advertising – X
5 18 Add This Advertising – X
6 18 Twitter Advertising – X
7 16 Quantcast Advertising – X
8 16 Amazon Retail & Hosting – X
9 11 Adobe Software & Services – X
10 11 Yahoo! Advertising – X
... – – – – –
31 5 Experian Data Broker X –
... – – – – –
47 3 Acxiom Data Broker X –
Furthermore, poorly-protected health information may be
abused by criminals. The retailer Target has used data-
mining techniques to analyze customers’ purchase history in
order to predict which women may be pregnant in order to
offer them special discounts on infant-related products.[5]
Even if shoppers and surfers are comfortable with compa-
nies collecting this data, that is no guarantee it is safe from
thieves. In 2013, 40 million credit and debit card numbers
were stolen from Target.[15] While a stolen credit card may
be reissued, if Target’s health-related data were leaked on-
line, it could have a devastating impact on millions of people.
Merely storing personally-identifiable information on health
conditions raises the potential for loss, theft, and abuse.
6.2 Blind Discrimination
Advertisers regularly promise that their methods are wholly
anonymous and therefore benign, yet identification is not
always required for discriminatory behavior to occur. In
2013, Latanya Sweeney investigated the placement of online
advertisements which implied a given name was associated
with a criminal record.[26] She found that the presence of
such ads were not the result of particular names being those
of criminals, but appeared based on the racial associations
of the name, with “black names” more often resulting in an
implication of criminal record. In this way extant societal
injustices may be replicated through advertising mechanisms
online. Discrimination against the ill may also be replicated
through the collection and use of browsing behavior.
Data mining techniques often rely on an eclectic approach
to data analysis. In the same way that a stew is the result
of many varied ingredients being mixed in the same pot, be-
havioral advertising is the result of many types of browsing
behavior being mixed together in order to detect trends. As
with ingredients in a stew, no single piece of data has an
overly deterministic impact on the outcome, but each has
some impact. Adding a visit to a weather site in the data
stew will have an outcome on the offers an user receives, but
not in a particularly nefarious way. However, once health in-
formation is added to the mix, it becomes inevitable that it
will have some impact on the outcome. As medical expenses
leave many with less to spend on luxuries, these users may
be segregated into “data silos”[27] of undesirables who are
then excluded from favorable offers and prices. This forms
a subtle, but real, form of discrimination against those per-
ceived to be ill.
6.3 Risk Assessment
Having collected data on how much tracking is taking place,
how it occurs, and who is doing it, it is necessary to expli-
cate how this constitutes a risk to users. As noted earlier,
there are two main types of harm which I call identification,
and blind discrimination. Table 2 shows a breakdown of how
data collection by twelve companies (top ten and data bro-
kers) impacts the two types of risk. The two data brokers
most obviously entail a personal identification risk as their
entire business model is devoted to selling personal informa-
tion. It is unlikely they are selling raw web tracking data
directly, but it may be used as part of aggregate measures
which are sold.
Despite the fact that Google does not sell user data, they
do possess enough “anonymous” data to identify many users
by name. Google offers a number of services which collect
detailed personal information such as a user’s personal email
(Gmail), work email (Apps for Business), and physical lo-
cation (Google Maps). For those who use Google’s social
media offering, Google+, a real name is forcefully encour-
aged. By combining the many types of information held
by Google services, it would be fairly trivial for the com-
pany to match real identities to “anonymous” web browsing
data. Likewise, Facebook requires the use of real names for
users, and as noted before, collects data on 31% of pages;
therefore, Facebook’s collection of browsing data may also
result in personal identification. In contrast, Twitter allows
for pseudonyms as well as opting-out of tracking occurring
off-site.
The potential for blind discrimination is most pronounced
among advertisers. As noted above, online advertisers use
complex data models which combine many pieces of unre-
lated information to draw conclusions about “anonymous”
individuals. Any advertiser who is collecting and process-
ing health browsing data will use it in some way unless it is
filtered and disposed of.
7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The privacy issues raised by this research are of a technical
nature and invite technical solutions. These solutions of-
ten come in the form of “add-on” software which users may
install in their web browsers. Such browser add-ons have
proven effective at blocking certain types of behavioral track-
ing.[19][24] However, this type of solution places a burden
on users and has not been broadly effective. As measure-
ment research has shown, tracking has only increased over
the past decade despite technical efforts to reign it in.
Purely technical solutions are problematic as they require
a relatively high level of knowledge and technical expertise
on the part of the user. The user must first understand the
complex nature of information flows online in order to seek
out technical remedies. Next, the user must be proficient
enough to install and configure the appropriate browser add-
ons. This may seem trivial for the well-educated, but many
who use the Internet have little education or training in
computing. Despite this, these users deserve to have their
health privacy protected.
Furthermore, add-ons are often unavailable on the default
browsers of smartphones and tablets - making it difficult for
even the highly skilled to protect their privacy. A final rea-
son that browser add-ons provide insufficient remedy is the
fact that advertisers devote significant resources to overcom-
ing such barriers and will always find creative ways to bypass
user intent. Thus, on one hand we have users who are poorly
equipped to defend themselves with available technical mea-
sures, and on the other, highly motivated and well-funded
corporations with cutting-edge technologies.
In order to effectively tackle the issue of tracking on health-
related pages, attention toward the underlying social dy-
namics is needed. These dynamics are formalized by gov-
ernment and corporate policies. By addressing policy is-
sues directly, rather than combating obscure tracking tech-
niques, we may produce durable solutions which outlast to-
day’s technology cycle. Unfortunately, extant polices are
few in number and weak in effect.
7.1 Extant Policies and Protections
Health information is one of the few types of personal in-
formation which has been granted special protections. The
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)[30]
is a U.S. law which stipulates how medical information may
be handled, stored, and accessed. HIPAA is not meant to
police business practices in general, rather it is tailored to
those providing health-specific services such as doctors, hos-
pitals, and insurance claims processors. Yet, even within
this realm, HIPAA provides incomplete protections. Con-
trary to popular perceptions, HIPAA permits the disclosure
of patient information between health providers and insur-
ance claims processors without patient notification or con-
sent. HIPAA generally does not allow patients to restrict
the flow of their sensitive data; therefore, extending HIPAA
in the online domain does not present an effective approach
to privacy protection.
Nevertheless, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has
established a “Health Breach Notification Rule” which re-
quires entities holding personally identifiable health records
to notify users if such records have been stolen.[31] How-
ever, merely providing health information (rather than stor-
ing doctor’s notes or prescription records) does not place a
business under the jurisdiction of HIPAA or associated rules.
Many businesses that handle health information are subject
to virtually no oversight and the main source of policy re-
garding the use of health information online comes in the
form of self-regulation by the parties which stand to benefit
the most from capturing user data: online advertisers.
However, self-regulation has proven wholly insufficient. No
lesser authority than the FTC determined that “industry ef-
forts to address privacy through self-regulation have been
too slow, and up to now have failed to provide adequate
and meaningful protection”.[32] When self-regulations are
present, there are no serious sanctions for violating the rules
which advertisers draw up among themselves. Neverthe-
less, the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) has produced
a “Code of Conduct” which requires opt-in consent for ad-
vertisers to use “precise information” about health condi-
tions such as cancer and mental-health.[21] Yet the same
policy also states that “member companies may seek to tar-
get users on the basis of such general health categories as
headaches”.[21] Given that the range of ailments between
cancer and a headache is incredibly broad, this directive
provides virtually no oversight. Likewise, the Digital Ad-
vertising Alliance (DAA) provides rules which also appear
to protect health information, but legal scholars have de-
termined that “an Internet user searching for information
about or discussing a specific medical condition may still be
tracked under the DAA’s principles”.[12]
7.2 Potential Interventions
Although this problem is complex, it is not intractable and
there are several ways health privacy risks may be mitigated.
First, there is no reason for non-profits, educational institu-
tions, or government-operated sites to be leaking sensitive
user information to commercial parties. While ad-revenue
keeps commercial sites running, non-profits gain support
from donors and grants. Fixing this situation could be as
simple as an internal policy directive on a per-institution ba-
sis, or as expansive as adopting language which would deny
funding to institutions which leak user data.
As for commercial-oriented sites, it is true that they rely
on ad-tracking revenue. However, regulatory and legislative
bodies have the authority to draft and implement policies
which would require a mandatory limitation on how long
information from health-related websites could be retained
and how it could be used. Such policy initiatives could have
significant impact, and would reflect the preferences of the
public.
Finally, talented engineers may devote a portion of the time
they spend analyzing data to developing intelligent filters to
keep sensitive data quarantined. The spark of change could
be the result of a single engineer’s “20% time” project. If
the mad rush to ingest ever more data is tempered with
a disciplined approach to filtering out potentially sensitive
data, businesses and users may both benefit equally.
8. CONCLUSION
Proving privacy harms is always a difficult task. However,
this study has demonstrated that data on health information
seeking is being collected by an array of entities which are
not subject to regulation or oversight. Health information
may be inadvertently misused by some companies, sold by
others, or even stolen by criminals. By recognizing that
health information deserves to be treated with special care,
we may mitigate what harm may already be occurring and
proactively avoid future problems.
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